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FREE  WILL’S  ENORMOUS  COST:
WHY  RETRIBUTION,  GROUNDED  IN  FREE
WILL,  IS  AN  INVALID  AND  IMPRACTICAL
PENAL  GOAL
Matthew D. Moyer*
“[O]ur criminal law is so rooted in theological ideas of free will and moral responsibil-
ity and juridical ideas of retribution . . . that we by no means make what we should of
our discoveries.”1
“Prison is for the people we’re scared of, not the people we’re mad at.”2
INTRODUCTION
In August 2008, fifty-two-year-old Daniel Mosley purchased four ounces
of methamphetamine from his drug dealer in Norman, Oklahoma.3  He was
pulling out of the dealer’s driveway when he was apprehended and arrested
by local police.4  Mosley cooperated with law enforcement, admitting that he
had purchased meth and that he had previously been arrested for meth-
related offenses.5  In the past, Mosley suffered from drug and alcohol addic-
tion, leading to convictions ranging from DUI to possession of marijuana and
methamphetamine.6  After being released on bond, Mosley voluntarily
checked himself into an inpatient drug treatment center, admitting that he
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor of Arts in
Philosophy, Boston College, 2015.  I would like to thank my family and friends for their
love and support, as well as Professor Stephen F. Smith for his fantastic feedback.  I would
also like to thank my friend James E. Britton for encouraging me to explore this topic in
great detail, and for welcoming conversation on the matter.
1 Roscoe Pound, Book Review, 3 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 281, 283–84 (1909) (reviewing
MAURICE PARMELEE, THE PRINCIPLES OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY IN THEIR RELATION
TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1908)).
2 Eric Zorn, ‘Prison Is for the People We’re Scared of, Not the People We’re Mad At’, CHI. TRIB.
BLOGS (July 3, 2014, 8:32 AM), http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/
2014/07/prison-is-for-the-people-were-scared-of-not-the-people-were-mad-at.html.
3 State v. Mosley, 257 P.3d 409, 410 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LIVING DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIO-
LENT OFFENSES 107 (2013) [hereinafter ACLU REPORT], https://www.aclu.org/sites/de
fault/files/field_document/111813-lwop-complete-report.pdf.
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was addicted to drugs and alcohol.7  He was convicted under Oklahoma law
for buying the meth.8
In a presentence report, Mosley’s parole officer noted his successful
completion of the drug treatment program and the drug-free lifestyle he had
since avowed.  The officer determined that Mosley was not a threat to the
public, and recommended a one-year community sentence.9  The judge
stated that she wanted to show mercy, but her hands were tied.10  Under
Oklahoma’s habitual drug offender statute, Mosley’s prior convictions man-
dated that he receive life without the possibility of parole for his conviction.11
Due to a nonviolent crime, a man deemed a nonthreat by his parole officer
was sentenced to die in prison.
Mosley’s sentence is not exceptional,12 and neither are the circum-
stances that led him to a life of addiction and drug abuse.  He grew up in a
house of drug and alcohol addicts, leaving home at the age of seventeen to
escape physical abuse from family members.13  In treatment, Mosley acknowl-
edged that his upbringing likely led to his own abuse of drugs.14  Examining
Mosley’s story, it is hard to view him as completely free in his actions.  To
start, environmental factors increased his chances of becoming an addict in
the first place.15  Second, once he was addicted, the force of addiction
undoubtedly compelled Mosley to buy drugs to satisfy his addiction.16  It is
odd, to say the least, that a man so diligently seeking to reform himself could
7 Id. at 107–08.  Mosley stated, “I needed long-term extensive treatment and therapy
but did not get it in prison.  Prison did not work.  I got to this very effective treatment
program.  I actually get into recovery!” Id. at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Id. at 107.
9 Id. at 108.  The parole officer stated, “[Mosley] does not appear to pose an immedi-
ate threat to the community . . . it seems it would be most beneficial to work with him in a
community setting.” Id. (omission in original).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 For an extensive list of current prisoners sentenced to life without possibility of
parole for nonviolent crimes, see generally id.
13 Id.  Science suggests that some people have a genetic predisposition to addiction,
making children of addicts more likely to become addicts themselves. See NAT’L INST. ON
DRUG ABUSE, DRUGS, BRAINS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION 8 (2014), https://
www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/soa_2014.pdf (“The influence of the home envi-
ronment, especially during childhood, is a very important factor.  Parents or older family
members who abuse alcohol or drugs, or who engage in criminal behavior, can increase
children’s risks of developing their own drug problems. . . . Scientists estimate that genetic
factors account for between 40 and 60 percent of a person’s vulnerability to addiction; this
includes the effects of environmental factors on the function and expression of a person’s
genes.”).
14 ACLU REPORT, supra note 6, at 108.
15 See supra note 13 (discussing how environmental factors and genetic predisposition
make a person more likely to become an addict).
16 See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 13, at 7 (“[I]mpairment in self-control is
the hallmark of addiction.  Brain imaging studies of people with addiction show physical
changes in areas of the brain that are critical to judgment, decision making, learning and
memory, and behavior control.  Scientists believe that these changes alter the way the brain
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be sentenced to life without parole for feeding an addiction that was all but
thrust upon him by the cards he was dealt.
In the context of addiction, it is easy to understand that the addict might
lack free will, as his brain is fundamentally altered by the drugs he takes.17
Addiction is an obvious case of lessened or lacking freedom, and is easily
understood: drugs act on the brain and change its chemistry, altering the
drug user’s behavior.  But this Note takes the position that addiction is
merely one example of the nonfreedom that pervades the human experience.
External, environmental factors, working on and with the brain, are suffi-
cient to determine activity.  Brains are made of matter, which operates in a
deterministic way, in accord with the laws of biology, chemistry, and physics.
Therefore, consciousness and decisionmaking arising from that material
brain must be similarly determined.  In the addiction context, the forces suf-
ficient to determine activity are early environmental exposure to drug use,
genetic predisposition, initial recreational use, and so forth.  With everyday
decisions, like what to eat for breakfast,18 there are similarly forces external
to conscious control that, when taken together, are sufficient for the brain to
make the choice one way or the other.
The pervasive penological goal of retribution runs afoul of this deter-
minism.  It stands for the idea that people deserve punishment when they
tear the moral fabric of society by breaking laws.  It presupposes free will,
because to deserve punishment, one has to have a free choice to break the
law in the first place.  Part I of this Note describes retribution’s role as a
major penological goal.  Part II argues that since free will is a necessary
assumption for retribution, free will’s nonexistence renders the penological
goal illogical.  Part III examines two major drug laws whose passage and
enforcement were predicated, in large part, upon retributive morality.  It dis-
cusses an appeals court case in which the merits of a common-law defense of
free will to drug possession were considered and ultimately rejected.  Part IV
discusses the enormous cost imposed upon society by the retributive passage
and enforcement of drug laws.  Finally, Part V of this Note briefly surveys the
utilitarian-based goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation, offer-
ing them as superior alternatives due to their focus on benefitting society.
works and may help explain the compulsive and destructive behaviors of addiction.” (foot-
note omitted)).
17 See id.
18 See JOHN DIES AT THE END (Touchy Feely Films 2013) (“There are a [ton] of sub-
atomic particles in the universe, each set into outward motion at the moment of the big
bang.  Thus whether or not you move your right arm now or nod your head or choose to
eat fruity pebbles or corn flakes next Thursday morning was all decided at the moment the
universe crashed into existence seventeen billion years ago.”).
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I. RETRIBUTION AS A GOAL OF PUNISHMENT
There are several justifications behind punishing people for criminal
acts.  The first is retribution, “punishment’s traditional moral purpose.”19
Retribution presupposes that criminal action “inherently merits punish-
ment.”20  It stands for the proposition that the punishment must match the
crime.21  While most adherents to a retribution-based model of justice do not
take the “eye for an eye” mantra literally, many still believe that murdering
another warrants a death sentence for the convict, for example.  Unlike the
other penological justifications of rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacita-
tion, retribution is not aimed at any practical social good.22  It stands for the
proposition that those in violation of moral laws necessarily deserve punish-
ment, as they chose to shatter the moral fabric of society.  To make the claim
that one’s choices determine her blameworthiness, one must assume that
free will exists.23  If free will is an illusion, it would make no sense to consider
a person blameworthy for acts not freely chosen.  This Note argues that since
there is no free will, people cannot logically deserve punishment on account
of their choices.  As such, retribution should not be used as a justification for
punishment.  In its place, legislatures and judges should apply rehabilitation,
deterrence, and incapacitation as penological goals to use punishment as a
means to an end: social benefit.24
II. ATTACKING FREE WILL, A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR RETRIBUTION
On one hand, as human beings, we have an abiding sense that we are
free to act in whatever way we please.  We are convinced that we are the
unbound, unfixed sources of our own decisions.25  On the other hand, we
know that the universe operates deterministically, governed by the laws of
19 Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313–14 (2000); see also Albert
W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century
and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2003).
20 Cotton, supra note 19, at 1315.
21 Adil Ahmad Haque, Lawrence v. Texas and the Limits of the Criminal Law, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (referring to “the retributive goal of penalizing rights viola-
tions in proportion to the harm caused and the violator’s culpability”).
22 Cotton, supra note 19, at 1316.
23 See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[T]he common
law has long held that the capacity to control behavior is a prerequisite for criminal respon-
sibility.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
24 See Cotton, supra note 19, at 1316.
25 See Azim F. Shariff et al., Free Will and Punishment: A Mechanistic View of Human Nature
Reduces Retribution, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1, 1 (2014) (“Although few people deny that humans
regularly make uncoerced choices and exercise self-control, many scientists and philoso-
phers have taken issue with the idea that conscious humans can generate spontaneous
choices and actions not fully determined by prior events . . . .”).
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physics, biology, chemistry, and so forth.26  So how could it be that human
beings, composed of matter (much like everything else) are free from the
deterministic laws of science, and able to function as the undetermined
sources of our volitions?  If the neurons in our brain, interacting among
themselves and with the rest of the body, create consciousness, it hardly
seems that we can be free.27  After all, neurons are just cells, made of matter,
transmitting signals according to discernable (though not fully understood)
scientific laws.28
Due to principles of cause and effect, our whole mental existence may
be the effect for which the action of our neural machinery is the cause.  And
causes determine effect.29  On the other hand, if there is something non-
physical about our conscious selves, such as a soul, then that could be the
uncaused, unfixed source of the decisionmaking process.  Resultantly,
whether or not free will exists turns on what the source of consciousness is.
Free will, or libertarianism, necessarily involves belief in something apart
from the physical.30  Determinism involves the belief that matter, governed
by science-based laws of cause and effect, creates our consciousness.31  If this
is true, then consciousness and decisionmaking are fixed by the physical, bio-
logical, and chemical processes that underlie them.
A. The Libertarian Position
Libertarians adhere to the belief that free will exists.  Together with the
strong, intuitive experience of freedom, the historical roots of free will pro-
vide an explanation for its unshakable place in modern thought.  Early
beliefs in free will trace back to Hellenistic philosophers.  The influential phi-
losopher Plato (428–347 BCE) believed that human beings have a soul and
that freedom was a faculty of the soul.  The “rational part of the soul . . .
govern[s] the lower, passionate parts of the soul.”32  Plato’s conception of
the passionate aspects of the soul implies their nonfreedom: passions are
things that just happen to us.33  The rational soul, in its freedom, rules over
26 See JOHN T. ROBERTS, THE LAW-GOVERNED UNIVERSE 1 (2008) (“Scientific inquiry has
revealed to us a universe that is governed by laws of nature. . . . The laws of nature govern
the universe in the sense that the universe cannot but conform to them . . . .”).
27 See David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2011), http://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/07/the-brain-on-trial/308520/ (“The drives you
take for granted . . . depend on the intricate details of your neural machinery.”).
28 NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, BRINGING THE POWER OF SCIENCE TO BEAR ON DRUG
ABUSE AND ADDICTION (2007), https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/
1923-bringing-the-power-of-science-to-bear-on-drug-abuse-and-addiction.pdf.
29 See MANICKAM NAMBI, THE END OF KNOWLEDGE: A REDUCTION OF PHILOSOPHY 150
(2011) (“The commonly accepted view is that the cause determines effect.  It means the
outcome is determined by the cause.”).
30 See infra Section II.A.
31 See JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 216 (2004).
32 Phillip Cary, A Brief History of the Concept of Free Will: Issues That Are and Are Not Ger-
mane to Legal Reasoning, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 165, 167 (2007).
33 See id.
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those passions.34  Another of the most influential proponents of the exis-
tence of free will was the Christian philosopher and theologian Augustine
(354–430 CE).35  He believed that the will was a “distinct power of the
soul.”36  It conferred upon people the “innate ability to act or to feel . . .
free[ ] from external coercion.”37
Rene´ Descartes (1596–1650 CE) also had an enormous influence38 on
people’s view of the self and free will.39  Writing several centuries after the
Hellenistic philosophers and Augustine, Descartes was presented with chal-
lenges by newly developed laws of science.40  Consider gravity, a rudimentary
law of physics.  If a pen is dropped several feet above a table, with nothing
obstructing its path, it will invariably fall.41  The release of the pen is causally
sufficient for its fall to the table.  The law of gravity and the manifold laws of
science suggest that the physical world is deterministic, with rules external to
physical objects fixing their behavior.  Why would consciousness be an excep-
tion, since human beings are part of the physical realm?  Descartes’s answer
was to divide the universe into two realms: the mental and the physical.42  He
considered the mind to be an “immortal soul,” free from scientific investiga-
tion, thus free from causal determination by the laws of the physical realm.43
Descartes would have granted, though, that there is a material realm
that is “determined by the laws of physics.”44  But this realm would include
our bodies; and, positing that our undetermined minds inhabit physically
determined bodies creates a problem: “How does anything in the mind cause
anything in the body?”45  Our bodies are required for the carrying out of
conscious, free acts.  If the body is determined by laws of physics, the free
34 Id. (stating that the theme of the rational soul ruling over our passions is key to the
ancient understandings of human freedom).
35 Michael Mendelson, Saint Augustine, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/augustine/.
36 Cary, supra note 32, at 172.
37 Id. Belief in the soul, requisite for belief in freedom, is as entrenched as the convic-
tion of free will.  For an opinion on why this is so, see SEARLE, supra note 31, at 41 (“[M]ost
[of those believing in the soul] are people who hold this view for some religious rea-
sons . . . . It is a consequence of [belief in freedom and the soul] that when our body is
destroyed our soul can continue to survive; and this makes the view appealing to adherents
of religions that believe in an afterlife.  But among most of the professionals in the field,
[the belief in separation of mind and body] is not regarded as a serious possibility.”).
38 See Gary Hatfield, Rene´ Descartes, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta ed., 2014).
39 See SEARLE, supra note 31, at 13.
40 Id. at 14.
41 See id. at 216.
42 Id. at 14.
43 Id. at 15.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 17.
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mind would hardly be able to assert an effect on the determined limbs.46
Fixing this quandary requires accepting that the mind, like the rest of the
body, is physically governed, with neurons giving rise to our consciousnesses,
determining our thoughts and actions.
B. The Determinist Position
The determinist believes that “[e]very event that happens in the physical
world is determined [or caused] by preceding physical events.”47  In the case
of human consciousness and the decisionmaking process, the event preced-
ing consciousness is the interactive network of communications between neu-
rons with each other and with the rest of the body.  The theory is that the
complex, microscopic interactions in the brain cause, and thus determine,
the state of consciousness and the decisionmaking process at any given
time.48  It does not take a neuroscientist or advanced philosopher to under-
stand this.  One must simply believe that consciousness lives and dies by neu-
ronal brain activity.  It requires believing not only in a correlation between
brain activity and the conscious mind, but in a causal force flowing from the
brain, resulting in and determining the mind.
1. Brain Pathology Studies
Interestingly, some of the more bizarre cases of brain-damaged patients
provide support for the conclusion that the brain causes the mind.  In 1848,
twenty-five-year-old railroad worker Phineas Gage received severe damage to
his ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC),49 an area of the brain thought
to have some role in the social decisionmaking process.50  Gage was working
on the railroad when an iron rod shot through his skull during an unin-
tended explosion, taking much of his VMPFC with it.51  Shockingly, Gage
survived, but was considered by friends to have become a completely differ-
ent person.52  Some accounts hold that Gage changed “from ‘a reliable, well-
liked, respected, and organized’ to a ‘garrulous, sexually promiscuous, reck-
less, unreliable, and irresponsible—essentially a pseudo-psychopathic individ-
46 See id.  The idea of the soul inhabiting the determined body is referred to by some
as “the ghost in the machine.” Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting GIL-
BERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949)).
47 Id. at 24.
48 See id. at 150–58.
49 Stephan Schleim, Brains in Context in the Neurolaw Debate: The Examples of Free Will and
“Dangerous” Brains, 35 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 104, 107 (2012).
50 Wouter van den Bos & Berna Gu¨roglu, The Role of the Ventral Medial Prefrontal Cortex
in Social Decision Making, 29 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7631, 7631 (2009).
51 Schleim, supra note 49, at 107.
52 Id.
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ual.’”53  Gage’s doctor’s report also stated that he acted “very childish” and
that he was “uncontrollable by his friends” after the accident.54
In another case, patient “EVR” had a large brain tumor successfully
removed through extensive brain surgery.55  During the surgery, part of
EVR’s brain tissue surrounding the tumor was extricated.56  The damaged
portion overlapped, in part, with the same portion of Gage’s brain that was
removed by the rod.57  Like Gage, EVR experienced severe behavioral
changes post-incident.  He struggled with “severe social problems . . . lost his
job, savings, wife and children, [and] was unable to sustain a stable work
relation.”58
In a third example, a forty-year-old man in an otherwise normal state of
health developed a strong interest in child pornography.59  He also made
sexual advances towards his prepubescent stepdaughter, as well as workers at
a rehabilitation facility.60  Shortly after exhibiting these behaviors, doctors
discovered that he had a sizeable brain tumor.61  His tumor was removed,
and his erratic sexual behavior completely subsided.62  However, several
months later, the man developed a persistent headache, and the urge to view
child pornography was rekindled within.63  As it turns out, the man’s tumor
had grown back; upon its removal, his behavior improved again.64
In each of these cases, a person’s injury to a discrete area of the brain
was coupled with a drastic change in behavior.  These studies support the
proposition that changes in brain activity cause changes in a person’s mental
state and behavior.  “When your biology changes, so can your decision-mak-
ing and your desires.  The drives you take for granted (‘I’m a heterosexual/
homosexual,’ ‘I’m attracted to children/adults,’ ‘I’m aggressive/not aggres-
sive,’ and so on) depend on the intricate details of your neural machinery.”65
The above studies are extraordinary examples of the causality between the
physical and the mental, but they illustrate the principle impeccably.  It
53 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adrian Raine & Yaling Yang, The
Neuroanatomical Bases of Psychopathy: A Review of Brain Imaging Findings, in HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOPATHY 278, 279 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006)).
54 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting J.M. Harlow, Passage of an Iron Rod
Through the Head, 39 BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. 389 (1848)).
55 Id. at 108.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. For an additional example, see id. for the story of JZ, another patient for whom
the removal of part of his VMPFC caused a disturbance in his social decisionmaking
faculties.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See Jeffrey M. Burns & Russell H. Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with Pedophilia
Symptom and Constructional Apraxia Sign, 60 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 437, 437 (2003).
62 Id. at 438.
63 Id.
64 Id.  For an example of a patient whose brain damage improved his behavior, see
Schleim, supra note 49, at 109.
65 Eagleman, supra note 27.
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would be difficult to claim that the above patients, after their respective acci-
dents, freely chose to change their behavior so drastically, when alterations to
the brain more easily account for the changes.  The latter is the simpler,
more cogent theory.66  While Phineas Gage’s mental aberrations were caused
by a freak accident, the criminal predilections of others are caused by less
obvious, but similarly physically-determined phenomena.  In place of an iron
rod, the causes of a criminal’s choices include a brain being genetically
predisposed towards violence,67 as well as other prior events external to the
criminal, processed in his brain according to scientific laws, resulting in
behavior.
2. Direct Support
Strong direct support also exists for the proposition that free will is an
illusion.  In 1982, Benjamin Libet conducted a landmark study on the nature
of consciousness, decisionmaking, and their neural correlates.68  In Libet’s
experiment, subjects were instructed that at any given point, they were to flex
their wrists.69  They were asked to view a high-speed clock during the process
and to record exactly the point when they experienced the conscious desire
to flex the wrist.70  During the experiment, Libet recorded when the specific
electrical charge that causes wrist flexion was initiated in the brain.71  His
primary question was this: Which comes first, the initiation of the electrical
charge, or the conscious desire to flex the wrist?  The study showed that the
electrical charge begins 550 milliseconds before the actual activity.72  The
conscious desire to act occurred two hundred milliseconds before the act,
several hundred milliseconds after the electrical charge started to work its way
from the brain to the muscle.73  If unconsciously-felt electrical charges that
cause motor movement precede the conscious will to move, the experience
of volition may be a determined byproduct or result of something uncon-
scious and uncontrolled.74  Libet showed that “ ‘I choose to move’ is more of
66 See Occam’s Razor, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
Occams-razor (last updated June 4, 2015) (stating “of two competing theories, the simpler
explanation of an entity is to be preferred”).
67 See Matthew Jones, Note, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True
Impact of the Genetic Revolution, 52 DUKE L.J. 1031 (2003).
68 Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will?, 6 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 47, 49 (1999).
69 Id.
70 Id. (“[T]he subject report[ed] a ‘clock time’ at which he/she was first aware of the
wish or urge to act.”).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 47.
74 Id. at 55 (“The conscious feeling of exerting one’s will would then be regarded as an
epiphenomenon, simply a by-product of the brain’s activities but with no causal powers of
its own.”).
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an afterthought than the causal determining force during a simple motor
task.”75
Follow-up studies demonstrated similar results.  In one study, experi-
menters gave subjects two buttons, instructing them to press either one
immediately when the desire to do so arose.76  At the same time, subjects
viewed a screen that flashed one letter at a time on the screen for a small
period of time.77  Subjects were asked to report which letter they saw on the
screen when the conscious desire to hit a button arose.78  This way, experi-
menters could record at what point the conscious desire to act started.  On
average, subjects pressed the button 21.6 seconds after the onset of the
experiment.79  Fortunately, this allowed sufficient time for the brain uncon-
sciously to initiate the decisionmaking process before a conscious decision to
act began.  Experimenters found that the parts of the brain associated with
voluntary movements in the hands exhibited neuron activity, of the type that
leads to the final movement of pressing a button, up to ten seconds before the
conscious desire to move even arose.80  Once again, the evidence suggests
that the series of brain activities resulting in movement is initiated earlier in
time than the conscious desire to act even arises.81
C. Implications
The nonexistence of free will has implications for the validity of retribu-
tion as a penological goal.  Moral responsibility, under the theory of retribu-
tion, rests on the idea that a person should have acted differently in a given
context, assuming that the person could have acted differently.82  As argued,
free will is an illusion and all events are determined by laws of nature; as
such, the wrongdoer could not have acted differently, given that multiple ante-
cedent conditions determined his behavior.  This means that retribution has
no logical justification.
Drug laws are examples of proscriptions that rely on preserving the
moral fabric of society, a feature of retribution, for justification.  They are
thus fundamentally flawed.  Such laws ignore the compelling force of addic-
tion.  Even further, in the context of nonaddicting drugs the choice is simi-
larly nonfree; in that context, the determining events leading to the choice
are simply more numerous and less obvious than the single compulsion of
75 Joe Pierre, The Neuroscience of Free Will and the Illusion of “You”: How Hard Determinism
Could Inform the True Nature of the Self, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 8, 2014), https://www.psycho
logytoday.com/blog/psych-unseen/201411/the-neuroscience-free-will-and-the-illusion-
you.
76 Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,
11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543, 543 (2008).
77 Id.
78 Id. (this method emulated the recording of the “clock time” in Libet’s experiment).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 544.
81 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
82 Shariff et al., supra note 25, at 1–2.
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addiction.  Since retribution is not justified in either case, it should be
removed from consideration in the making of drug laws.  Our criminal jus-
tice system should bring the other penological goals to the fore, as they seek
societal wellbeing instead of the fulfillment of the outmoded theory of retri-
bution.  If Congress or states choose to keep drugs illegal, they should do so
solely through utilitarian justifications, eschewing retribution.
III. FREE WILL AND RETRIBUTION IN THE LAW
It has been said that “free will . . . is the sine qua non of our criminal
justice system.”83  Without confronting the matter head-on, courts interpret-
ing law implicitly accept judgments of the legislature that certain acts are
inherently evil and must be punished as committed.  Laws proscribing the
possession and consumption of drugs are examples of banning behavior due
to the judgment that it is evil, intrinsically warranting punishment.  But the
crippling, compulsive effect of addiction is a reason to alter the way we treat
addicts.  Addiction, most would recognize, can impel otherwise law-abiding
people continually to consume drugs, and therefore break the law.
As such, many objectors to our drug laws make an argument analogous
to determinism: if addicts are rendered without the ability to control their
urge to get high, they should not be held criminally liable.  This is an easier
pill to swallow than determinism full-stop, because many scientific studies
have directly proven how difficult addiction is to resist.84  Studies support the
proposition that factors outside of personal control govern behavior, so we
should not criminalize such actions based on a theory of retribution.  In addi-
tion, laws prohibiting the use and possession of nonaddictive drugs, like
marijuana, have roots in retribution; such laws are aimed, in part, at prevent-
ing people from damaging the moral fabric of society.  But the “choice” to
use such drugs is fundamentally nonfree, even outside of the addiction con-
text.  Once more, manifold factors are sufficient for someone to consume or
to avoid drugs.  As a result, laws establishing criminal prohibitions on mari-
juana cannot be justified on the grounds of retribution.  Whatever their cur-
rent justifications, drug prohibitions cannot be upheld on retributive
grounds.  History provides several examples of drug laws’ foundation in
retribution.
A. The Harrison Act, Addictive Drugs
The United States’ punishment of drug-related offenses is historically
rooted in retribution.  In 1914, Congress passed the Harrison Tax Act (“Har-
rison Act”),85 which was intended as a regulatory measure.86  It was designed
83 Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 83 n.39 (D.C. 1976); see also Pound, supra note
1, at 283–84 ( “[O]ur criminal law is so rooted in theological ideas of free will and moral
responsibility and juridical ideas of retribution . . . that we by no means make what we
should of our discoveries.”).
84 See supra note 16.
85 Harrison Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
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to produce revenue for the federal government from legal sales of narcotics,
while bringing the practice into the open to regulate it more closely.87  The
Act set up a licensing system, wherein purveyors of opiates and cocaine-based
drugs were required to keep records of their transactions.88  The regulations
were primarily aimed at “disreputable ‘pushers.’”89  At the time, doctors pre-
scribed patients small doses of narcotics, like morphine and cocaine, “for
relief of [withdrawal] conditions incident to addiction.”90  However sound
that practice was, it signifies that doctors sought to treat addicts as patients.91
Congress never suggested that it intended to change the status quo of treat-
ing drug addicts as “sufferers” in need of treatment.92  In fact, the Act specifi-
cally exempted from its requirements “the dispensing or distribution of any
of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician . . . in the course of his
professional practice.”93
Over time, the intent of the Act was derailed, and the statute was used by
the government as a draconian penal measure for the stigmatization of
addiction.94  The paradigm of the “dope fiend” contributed to the govern-
ment’s drive to prosecute addicts and those that treated them.95  In June of
1919, the Treasury Department released a report on the state of drug traffick-
ing throughout the country.96  In the report, there is a section titled “Effect
of Addiction on Morals.”97  It reads, in part:
From information in the hands of the committee, it is concluded that,
while drug addicts may appear to be normal to the casual observer, they are
usually individuals weak in character and will, and lacking in moral sense.   The
opium or morphine addict is not always a hopeless liar, a moral wreck, or a
creature sunk in vice and lost to all sense of decency and honor, but may
often be an upright individual except under circumstances which involve his
affliction, or the procuring of the drug of addiction. He will usually lie as to
the dose necessary to sustain a moderately comfortable existence, and he will
86 John M. Murtagh, Book Review, 91 YALE L.J. 363, 363–64 (1961) (reviewing DRUG
ADDICTION: CRIME OR DISEASE? INTERIM AND FINAL REPORTS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
(1961)).
87 Rufus G. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the
Sick, 62 YALE L.J. 736, 737 (1953).
88 See Harrison Tax Act § 2.
89 See King, supra note 87, at 737.
90 See Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
91 See King, supra note 87, at 737 (“Narcotics-users were ‘sufferers’ or ‘patients’ in
those days; they could and did get relief from any reputable medical practitioner . . . .”).
92 See id.
93 Harrison Act § 2(a).
94 See King, supra note 87, at 737.
95 Id.
96 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS: REPORT
OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION APPOINTED MARCH 25, 1918, BY THE SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY (1919).
97 Id. at 25.
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stoop to any subterfuge and even to theft to achieve relief from the bodily ago-
nies experienced as a result of the withdrawal of the drug.98
Such thinking led to widespread use of the Harrison Act as a tool to incarcer-
ate drug sellers and users.99
The Supreme Court upheld a reading of the Act that allowed convicting
doctors that prescribed narcotics for ambulatory treatment.  In United States
v. Behrman,100 the Court was faced with the question of whether a physician
doling out narcotics to treat addicts’ withdrawal symptoms violated the Harri-
son Act.101  The Court held that treating addicts with narcotics did not
exempt doctors from the Act, because it did not entail “the dispensing or
distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician . . . in the
course of his professional practice.”102  This holding criminalized a doctor’s
treatment of addicts, deeming it not within “the course of . . . professional
practice.”103  In its brief, the United States had argued for removing an
intent requirement and illegalizing the prescribing of narcotics to addicts,
the position the Court sustained.  By criminalizing the treatment of addicts as
such, the Court removed the need to prove that the doctor intended to dis-
tribute drugs for reasons other than treatment.  The United States grounded
its argument in morality: “[I]t is a well known fact, of which this court has
taken notice, that drug addicts as a class are persons weakened materially in
their sense of moral responsibility and in their power of will.”104  As a result,
the United States argued, “irrespective of the intent or knowledge, the trans-
fer of drugs [for treatment purposes] would not be, as a matter of law . . . in
the legitimate practice of a physician’s profession.”105  The Government
sought to deem addicts moral defectors, to punish them through an over-
broad reading of the Harrison Act on account of their immorality.  This is an
early example of penalizing drug activity on the grounds of retributive
morality.
98 Id. (emphasis added).  But see id. at 26 (“Among the addicts of the underworld,
practically all show a low mentality, a lack of decency and honor.  This condition, however,
is not entirely due to the effect of these drugs as might be inferred, but is largely the result
of degeneracy due to environment and association.”).  Despite stigmatizing the drug addict
as a “hopeless liar” and “moral wreck,” the report still acknowledged that uncontrolled
environmental factors cause the moral loss, leading to addiction, not necessarily vice versa.
Id. at 25.
99 See King, supra note 87, at 738 n.12 (stating that by June 1928, of the 7738 prisoners
in federal penitentiaries, 2529 were serving sentences for narcotics).
100 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
101 Id. at 285.  It is unlikely that the defendant, Dr. Behrman, was actually prescribing
narcotics for ambulatory treatment.  He doled out large quantities of narcotics to addicts
for use at their own discretion.  But the Government drew up a “trick-indictment,” seeking
a holding that even prescriptions for ambulatory treatment violated the Act.  King, supra
note 87, at 742.
102 Harrison Act § 2(a).
103 Id.
104 Brief for United States at 281, Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (No. 582).
105 Id. at 282.
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In Linder v. United States,106 ambulatory treatment of addicts received a
theoretical victory.  Dr. Linder, the defendant, prescribed one tablet of mor-
phine and three tablets of cocaine to an addict, to be used at her discretion,
for the treatment of her addiction symptoms.107  The Government’s indict-
ment was worded nearly identically to the Behrman indictment, accusing the
defendant of violating the Harrison Act simply by treating an addict, regard-
less of good faith or intent.108  The Court effectively disagreed with the hold-
ing in Behrman, stating that “[t]he enactment under consideration levies a
tax . . . and may regulate medical practice in the States only so far as reasona-
bly appropriate for or merely incidental to its enforcement.”109  The Court
added, “[The Act] says nothing of ‘addicts’ and does not undertake to pre-
scribe methods for their medical treatment.  They are diseased and proper
subjects for such treatment.”110  It refused to “conclude that a physician
acted improperly or unwisely or for other than medical purposes solely
because he has dispensed to one of them, in the ordinary course and in good
faith, four small tablets of morphine or cocaine for relief of conditions inci-
dent to addiction.”111  In so holding, the Court deemed that ambulatory
treatment was within the course of professional practice, exempting the
defendant from coverage under the Act.  It also stated that addicts should be
viewed as diseased and in need of treatment, rather than subjects of moral
regulation.
Despite this holding, the Bureau of Narcotics continued to punish the
use of ambulatory treatment by doctors, using the language of a federal regu-
lation to flout the holding in Linder.112  The long-standing regulation
provided:
An order purporting to be a prescription issued to an addict or habitual user
of narcotics, not in the course of professional treatment but for the purpose
of providing the user with narcotics sufficient to keep him comfortable by
maintaining his customary use, is not a prescription within the meaning and
intent of [the Act], and the person filling such a order . . . shall be subject
to . . . penalties.113
As the Bureau continued to enforce the Harrison Act against doctors, a large-
scale propaganda campaign was initiated, leading to the view that the drug
user was a “menace” rather than a person in need of treatment.114  By 1963,
106 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
107 Id. at 11.
108 Brief for United States at 10, Linder, 268 U.S. 5 (No. 183).
109 Linder, 268 U.S. at 18.
110 Id. (emphasis added).
111 Id.
112 See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
113 26 C.F.R. § 151.392 (1971), repealed by 36 Fed. Reg. 7778 (Apr. 24, 1971) (emphasis
added).
114 For a potent example of antidrug propaganda, see REEFER MADNESS (Motion Picture
Ventures 1936), released nationally in 1936.  At the beginning of the film, the foreword
reads:
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when the President established a commission to investigate narcotic abuse,
the Government admitted that “[o]ut of a fear of prosecution many physi-
cians refuse to use narcotics in the treatment of addicts . . . . In most
instances they shun addicts as patients.”115  The Government admitted that
lack of ambulatory treatment was troubling, as “[a]brupt withdrawal, the so-
called ‘cold turkey’ treatment, is very painful and can be dangerous. . . .
According to current medical opinion, the most humane method is to bring
about withdrawal by a gradual reduction of dosage.”116  So by the executive
branch’s own admission, the stigmatization of drug use and enforcement of
the Harrison Act led to neglect of treatment of addicts.  This faulty reading of
the Harrison Act represented an early attempt to stigmatize and punish those
that would treat addicts as afflicted, rather than morally degenerate.
B. The Controlled Substances Act and Nonaddictive Drugs (Marijuana)
The retributive, moralistic purpose of drug laws is further exemplified in
the history of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), contained within the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,117 particu-
larly, with the inclusion of marijuana as a Schedule I substance, the most
restrictive classification.118  To be classified in Schedule I, the drug must
“[have] a high potential for abuse . . . [, have] no currently accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States,” and “[t]here [must be] a lack of
accepted safety for use of the drug.”119  Marijuana is accompanied by heroin
and LSD in the Schedule I category, while cocaine and methamphetamine
are listed in the less restrictive Schedule II category.120  This seems incongru-
ous, as marijuana is widely considered low-risk, causing less harm to people
than alcohol or tobacco (which are not controlled substances at all under the
Act).121  Marijuana’s classification is especially suspect because it has widely-
The motion picture you are about to witness may startle you.  It would not have
been possible, otherwise, to sufficiently emphasize the frightful toll of the new
drug menace which is destroying the youth of America in alarmingly-increasing
numbers.  Marihuana is that drug—a violent narcotic—an unspeakable scourge
—The Real Public Enemy Number One!
Id.  The film was produced in close collaboration with the Bureau of Narcotics, the direct
predecessor of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG
LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 24 (2d ed. 2012).
115 PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COMM’N ON NARCOTIC & DRUG ABUSE, FINAL REPORT 57
(1963).
116 Id. at 53.
117 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242.
118 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012).
119 Id. § 812(b)(1).
120 Id. § 812(c).
121 See Dirk W. Lachenmeier & Ju¨rgen Rehm, Comparative Risk Assessment of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Cannabis and Other Illicit Drugs Using the Margin of Exposure Approach, SCI. REP. no.
5:8126, Jan. 30, 2015, at 4.
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accepted medical uses,122 which should knock it out of the scope of Schedule
I.123
Marijuana’s inclusion in the Schedule I category was ultimately a result
of its moral stigma among government officials rather than its actual effects
on health, or even the public’s view.  In the 1960s, leading up to the passage
of the Controlled Substances Act, a popular consensus was building against
harsh punishments for marijuana users,124 despite the fact that marijuana
use and distribution was largely prohibited by the states and the federal gov-
ernment’s Marihuana Tax Act.125  The increase of casual marijuana use on
college campuses as well as the “psychedelic movement” changed the think-
ing that marijuana users were all “addicts” exhibiting signs of “mental deteri-
oration, psychosis, and violent crime.”126  The belief that marijuana was tied
to moral degeneracy began to evaporate.127  Instead of violent criminals,
marijuana users were “sons and daughters of the middle and upper clas-
ses.”128  The culture of civil disobedience and protest also led to a backlash
against laws passed under the specious flag of morality.129  Widespread popu-
lar movements against war and in favor of civil rights, free speech, and eco-
logical preservation “weakened the moral force of the law as an institution by
illustrating the evil which could be codified by secular authorities.”130
122 See Jennifer Welsh & Kevin Loria, 23 Health Benefits of Marijuana, BUS. INSIDER (Apr.
20, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/health-benefits-of-medical-marijuana-2014-4.
Widely-accepted benefits include treatment of glaucoma, epilepsy, anxiety, multiple sclero-
sis, PTSD, and more. Id.; see also Rita Rubin, Many States Have Legalized Medical Marijuana,
So Why Does the DEA Still Say It Has No Therapeutic Use?, FORBES (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/ritarubin/2016/11/16/many-states-have-legalized-medical-marijuana-so-
why-does-dea-still-say-it-has-no-therapeutic-use/#44655e1535a1 (stating that “[m]ore than
half the states—28, to be exact—including Arkansas, Florida and North Dakota as of the
Nov. 8 election, and the District of Columbia have legalized marijuana for certain medical
conditions”).
123 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B) (stating that Schedule I drugs “[have] no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States”).
124 See RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION:
A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 222–47 (1974).
125 Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551; Helia Garrido Hull,
Lost in the Weeds of Pot Law: The Role of Legal Ethics in the Movement to Legalize Marijuana, 119
PENN. ST. L. REV. 333, 337–38 (2014) (“Congress elected to utilize a tax as an indirect
method to prohibit the production, use, and distribution of cannabis within the states. . . .
[T]axes [were] prohibitively high . . . [and violators were] subject to fines of up to $2000
dollars and imprisonment of up to five years. . . . States quickly followed, and by the end of
1937, 46 out of 48 states had officially classified cannabis as a narcotic . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
126 BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 124, at 222–24.
127 Id. at 225 (stating “the causal relationships between marihuana and crime, idleness,
and incapacitation were now more difficult to maintain”).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 224.
130 Id.; see also id. at 226 (“A . . . trend, well underway during the sixties, was de-empha-
sis of the criminal law as a means of social control.  Increasing numbers of legal scholars
and social scientists were beginning to indict the process of ‘overcriminalization’ under
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Accordingly, the moral force of drug laws was weakened by the tenor of the
times.131
Despite the public view, marijuana ended up listed among the most dan-
gerous drugs in the Controlled Substances Act.  This can be explained by
Congress’s and the Nixon Administration’s approach to marijuana.  Some
congressmen, before the Act passed, believed that marijuana users should be
punished retributively for rupturing the moral fabric of society.132  Senator
Robert Byrd, for example, argued that “drug abuse in the United States . . . is
eating away at the moral fiber of our nation.”133  One congressman, in sup-
port of an amendment that would treat drug users leniently, suggested that
without such a measure, the law was a “mere vehicle for moral indigna-
tion.”134  Others were less sure in their support of the Act, because around
the time of its passage, experts hotly debated the extent to which marijuana
actually harmed users.135  As a result, Congress opted to preserve the legal
status quo, listing marijuana with the most dangerous drugs under Schedule
I.136  But Congress intended to defer the question of how marijuana should
be classified in the long run.137  A committee report on the House version of
the bill recommended that marijuana should be “retained within Schedule I
at least until the completion of certain studies now underway.”138  The Act
established the Presidential Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse (“the
which the sphere of criminal conduct had been too broadly drawn. . . . The view that
criminal law was not the only, or even the best, way for society to express its disapproval of
certain behavior was certainly a notion foreign to early twentieth-century policy makers.”).
131 The reduction in sentencing for marijuana possession in Virginia is representative.
In 1969, twenty-year-old Frank P. Lavarre was arrested for possessing around $2500 in mari-
juana.  Because he did not release the names of those he dealt to, his bond was set at
$50,000.  Following his guilty plea, Lavarre was sentenced to twenty-five years in the state
penitentiary, with parole eligibility after five years.  Less than a year later, the governor
pardoned Lavarre, which was applauded locally.  In response to this incident, Virginia
reduced first-time possession of marijuana to a misdemeanor punishable by $1000 or less
than twelve months in jail. Id. at 240–41.
132 Members of Congress made moral arguments with undertones of retribution in
favor of illegalizing drugs. See 116 CONG. REC. H33603, at 33,648 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1970)
(statement of Rep. Don H. Clausen) (stating “I view the drug problem in America as part
and parcel of the rising specter of moral, social, and national decay that is creeping over
America”); id. at 33,654 (statement of Rep. Harold Donohue) (stating “[t]o save our own
children and our neighbor’s children, it is absolutely essential that we join together in
strengthening our Federal law to prevent this evil plague from spreading its infectious
poisons any deeper into the moral fabric of our youth”).
133 116 CONG. REC. S1159, at 1183 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1970) (statement of Sen. Robert
Byrd).
134 116 CONG. REC. H33603, at 33,616 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1970) (statement of Rep.
Robert Giaimo).
135 BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 124, at 246.
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 Id. at 247 (quoting H.R. 1444, 91st Cong. (1970)).
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Shafer Commission”) to study the effects of marijuana, intending to leave the
final classification of marijuana to the President and his Commission.139
Any argument from the Commission that marijuana prohibitions should
be lessened would face an uphill battle, as President Richard Nixon ardently
opposed lax marijuana laws.  When asked about his feelings towards mari-
juana, he said, “I can see no moral or social justification whatever for legaliz-
ing marihuana.”140  He also stated at a press conference, “I am against
legalizing marihuana.  Even if the Commission does recommend that it be
legalized, I will not follow that recommendation.”141  In a private conversa-
tion, Nixon told Shafer, the chairman of the Commission, “I think there’s a
need to come out with a report that is totally, uh, uh, oblivious to some obvi-
ous, uh, differences between marijuana and other drugs . . . [despite that]
there are differences.”142  So that the Commission would reach the result he
sought, Nixon “stacked [the] deck” by appointing members that would likely
support his anti-marijuana agenda.143  On March 22, 1972, the Commission
released its report titled “Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding.”144
Despite the ostensible bias of his Commission, President Nixon did not
receive the results he had hoped for.145  The Shafer Commission concluded
that “[n]o significant physical, biochemical, or mental abnormalities could
be attributed solely to . . . marihuana smoking.”146  It also noted that “[m]ost
users, young or old, demonstrate an average or above-average degree of
social functioning, academic achievement and job performance.”147  As a
policy matter, the Shafer Commission concluded that “[m]arihuana’s relative
potential for harm to the vast majority of individual users and its actual
impact on society does not justify a social policy designed to seek out and
firmly punish those who use it.”148  In fact, the Commission recommended
changing the law so that marijuana possession for personal use was no longer
139 Id. Today, the Attorney General has the authority to change the classification of
drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012).  However, the Attorney General traditionally has dele-
gated this role to the DEA. See All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15
F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
140 BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 124, at 256.
141 Id.
142 September 9, 1971, Between 3:03 PM and 3:34 PM: Oval Office Conversation 568-4: The
President Met with Raymond P. Shafer, Jerome H. Jaffe, & Egil G. (“Bud”) Krogh, Jr.. COMMON
SENSE FOR DRUG POL’Y, http://www.csdp.org/research/nixonpot.txt (last visited Apr. 7,
2017).
143 BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 124, at 255–56 (discussing how Nixon’s appoin-
tees’ average age was fifty-four and included a former police officer, the executive pro-
ducer of Sesame Street, the president of Rockford College, and two men vying for federal
judgeships, including the chairman of the Commission, Governor Raymond Shafer).
144 NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDER-
STANDING (1972) (hereinafter SHAFER COMMISSION).
145 Gregg A. Bilz, The Medical Use of Marijuana: The Politics of Medicine, 13 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL’Y 117, 122 (1992).
146 SHAFER COMMISSION, supra note 144, at 61.
147 Id. at 96.
148 Id. at 130.
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an offense.149  It also recommended removing transfer of small amounts of
marijuana for insignificant value from prohibition.150  As he had promised,
Nixon ignored the recommendations of the Commission.  Instead of remov-
ing prohibitions on marijuana or rescheduling it, he commenced the War on
Drugs.151
In doing so, President Nixon changed the fabric of the drug criminaliza-
tion debate.  The classification and criminalization of marijuana was now
highly politicized, with science taking a backseat.152  Time has revealed
Nixon’s reasons for retaining marijuana as a heavily restricted Schedule I
drug in the face of his own hand-picked Commission recommending a con-
trary result.  After Nixon’s resignation in 1974, tapes containing 3700 hours
of conversations taking place during his presidency were released.153  One
recorded conversation occurred between Nixon, Chief of Staff H.R. Halde-
man, and Domestic Affairs Advisor John Ehrlichman.  During the discussion,
Nixon said, “[L]et’s look at the strong societies.  The Russians. . . . Do you
think the Russians allow dope?  Hell no. . . . You see, homosexuality, dope,
immorality in general: These are the enemies of strong societies.”154  Nixon’s
purpose was a moral one: he sought to root out marijuana users because what
they were doing, in his view, was immoral by itself, regardless of the harm it
actually caused to society.
Today, marijuana retains its place on the list of Schedule I drugs.155
The DEA, with principal responsibility for reclassification, has recently cho-
sen to keep marijuana in Schedule I.156  Its reasoning is that marijuana does
not have an accepted medical use, justifying its place in the Schedule I cate-
149 Id. at 152 (“Possession of marihuana for personal use would no longer be an
offense . . . .”).
150 Id. (“Casual distribution of small amounts of marihuana for no remuneration, or
insignificant remuneration not involving profit would no longer be an offense.”).
151 See Bilz, supra note 145, at 123.
152 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 124, at 248 (stating that “use of the drug had
so easily been translated into a political symbol,” “politics would continue to dominate the
rhetoric,” and “fact-finding was irrelevant to [the] outcome”).
153 Evan Thomas, The Untapped Secret of the Nixon Tapes, ATLANTIC (July 29, 2014), http:/
/www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/the-untapped-wealth-of-secrets-in-the-
nixon-tapes/374868/.
154 May 13, 1971, Between 10:30 AM and 12:30 PM: Oval Office Conversation 498-5: Meeting
with Nixon, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, COMMON SENSE FOR DRUG POL’Y, http://www.csdp
.org/research/nixonpot.txt (last visited Apr. 7, 2017) (emphasis added); see also May 26,
1971, Between 10:03 AM and 11:35 AM: Oval Office Conversation 505-4: Meeting with Nixon and
H.R. “Bob” Haldeman, http://www.csdp.org/research/nixonpot.txt (last visited Apr. 7,
2017) (Nixon: “You know it’s a funny thing, every one of the bastards that are out for
legalizing marijuana is Jewish.  What the Christ is the matter with the Jews, Bob, what is the
matter with them?”).
155 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10) (2012).
156 Carrie Johnson, DEA Rejects Attempt to Loosen Federal Restrictions on Marijuana, NPR
(Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/10/489509471/dea-rejects-attempt-to-
loosen-federal-restrictions-on-marijuana.
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gory.157  The federal government’s perpetuation of the status quo runs con-
trary to the shifting of the status quo in favor of legalizing medical marijuana
for the benefits it provides.158  Although the DEA does not espouse a retribu-
tive purpose in its total proscription on marijuana use, marijuana’s place-
ment and early retainment in Schedule I must be attributed, in large part, to
retributive morality.
C. Appeals Courts Encounter the Question of Free Will
On a few occasions, appeals courts have addressed whether drug users
can be penalized for prescribing or consuming drugs.  In Linder v. United
States, the Supreme Court avoided a reading of the Harrison Act that would
illegalize the prescription of small amounts of narcotics to addicts to treat
withdrawal symptoms.159  The Court opined that addicts are “diseased” and
“proper subjects for . . . treatment.”160  As such, it held that ambulatory treat-
ment was “in the course of professional practice,” exempting doctors’ nar-
cotic prescriptions from the control of the Harrison Act.161  Viewing addicts
as afflicted rather than moral agents implied the addict’s lack of freedom in
the matter.  In Robinson v. California,162 decades later, the Court resurrected
Linder’s idea that addicts are diseased and in need of treatment rather than
subjects of moralistic criminal punishment.  In that case, a California statute
made it a crime for a person to be addicted to narcotics.163  The Court lik-
ened proscribing addiction to illegalizing mental illness, leprosy, and the
common cold.164  Citing Linder, it held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ban on cruel and unusual punishment was violated because punishing addic-
tion was tantamount to punishing illness, something contracted “innocently”
and “involuntarily.”165
About a decade later, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit discussed the merits of a federal drug crime defendant’s “free will”
defense in United States v. Moore.166  This case provides an example of the
flawed reliance on free will to maintain the validity of drug laws.  Defendant
Moore was charged with possession of heroin under a federal statute.167  The
Government stipulated that Moore was addicted to heroin.168  Though
Moore admitted to being addicted to the drug, he claimed to have never
157 Id.
158 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
159 268 U.S. 5 (1925); see also supra notes 106–12.
160 Linder, 268 U.S. at 18.
161 Id. at 20.
162 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
163 Id. at 660.
164 Id. at 666.
165 Id. at 667.
166 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
167 Id. at 1142.
168 Id.
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engaged in drug trafficking.169  On these grounds, he sought to assert a com-
mon-law defense of “free will”: since he had become overpowered by addic-
tion, Moore claimed that he could not be held criminally liable for simple
possession of a drug that so strongly compelled him to consume it.170  Inter-
estingly, the court only upheld the conviction of Moore by a 5-4 majority.
The majority framed the problem by stating that “[a]ppellant attempts
to justify only the acts of possession and purchase of narcotics, both illegal,
and both prohibited because if successfully prohibited they would eliminate
drug addiction,” ostensibly beyond the appellant’s control.171  It shot down
the conclusion that lack of free will, due to the compulsion to take drugs,
could clear Moore of criminal liability.  The court reasoned that there are
two factors that define “self-control (or absence thereof)”: “the physical crav-
ing to have the drug”172 on one hand, and the addict’s “character” or “moral
standards” on the other.173  The court granted that “[d]rug addiction of vary-
ing degrees may or may not result in loss of self-control, depending on the
strength of character opposed to the drug craving.”174  In stating so, the
court implied that, sometimes, the strength of one’s character should be suf-
ficient to overcome physical addiction.
The court attributed the loss of self-control to the refusal of a person,
through good morals and high character, to fight off the urge.175  It implies
that this fight between the person’s moral side and his physical addiction is
his chance to exercise free will by staving off the compelling urge to take
drugs.  The court held that the mental act resulting in the possession or
purchase of drugs, the succumbing of morality to physical craving, is free,
and therefore reprehensible.  Once morality fails and compulsion takes over,
the resulting nonfree acts are punishable.  Essentially, the court recognized
that once an addict-to-be succumbs to the craving, he loses control.  Yet,
since he let his morality fall by the wayside in the first place, he acted freely
and can properly be held criminally liable.  The court’s second argument
against the free will defense was that recognizing a “lack of free will” defense
would lead to an illogical result.  It reasoned that the bank robber, taking
money by force to fund his drug addiction, is clearly less in control if driven
to such extreme measures.176  If courts refuse to punish simple possessors
because of their lack of freedom, they could not punish such bank robbers,
as they possess even less free will.  Even if there is no free will for the addict,
169 Id.
170 Id.; see also id. at 1145 (“The gist of appellant’s argument here is that ‘the common
law has long held that the capacity to control behavior is a prerequisite for criminal respon-
sibility.’” (quoting the appellant’s brief)).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 See id.
176 Id. at 1146.
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the thinking goes, it would force the conclusion that the bank robber is simi-
larly nonfree.
The D.C. Circuit’s characterization of addiction exhibits the fundamen-
tal misunderstanding of addiction and the decisionmaking process in gen-
eral.  First of all, it assumes that a person’s moral character may be sufficient
to overcome physical cravings.177  Otherwise, those who were powerless to
overcome addiction would be thought nonfree, and per the court’s own rea-
soning, not responsible.  As this Note has argued, multiple forces external to
the person, acting on and with the person’s neurons, determine her behav-
ior.178  In the addiction context, a panoply of forces including genetic predis-
position towards addiction, powerful environmental factors, and early
recreational use distort the decisionmaking process in a way sufficient to
make someone become an addict.179  Once a person becomes addicted to
narcotics, the chemicals she consumes have an immensely compelling force
on her behavior.180  Conscious experience changes, the chemicals create a
pleasure response in the brain, and the brain is wired to seek repetition of
activity that causes pleasure.181  So under scrutiny, the court’s two-factor the-
ory of addiction is flawed.  It reasoned that “[i]n the case of any addict there
are two factors that go to make up the ‘self-control’ (or absence thereof)
which governs his activities, and which determines whether or not he will
perform certain acts.”182  The two factors (the addict’s moral character and
the physical craving to take drugs183) are underinclusive.  This approach, in
its misguided simplicity,184 fails to account for the multitude of antecedent
conditions sufficient to cause one to become an addict.  This case got wrong
what Linder and Robinson got right: that in the legal context, as well as scien-
tific reality, addicts are properly viewed as nonfree, afflicted with an illness
outside of personal control.
177 See id. at 1145.
178 See supra Part II.
179 See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 13, at 8–9 (stating that “[t]he influence
of the home environment, especially during childhood, is a very important factor.  Parents
or older family members who abuse alcohol or drugs, or who engage in criminal behavior,
can increase children’s risks of developing their own drug problems,” “[s]cientists estimate
that genetic factors account for between 40 and 60 percent of a person’s vulnerability to
addiction; this includes the effects of environmental factors on the function and expres-
sion of a person’s genes,” and “early use is a strong indicator of problems ahead, including
addiction”).
180 See id.
181 Id. at 17–18.
182 Moore, 486 F.2d at 1145.
183 Id.
184 See id. (“Putting it in mathematical terms, if the addict’s craving is 4 on a scale of 10,
and his strength of character is only 3, he will have a resulting loss of self-control and
commit some illegal act to acquire drugs, perhaps only an illegal purchase and
possession.”)
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D. Examples in Sentencing
The sentencing context is another in which the assumption of free will
arises.  The Model Penal Code places a heavy emphasis on retribution as an
important end in sentencing criminals.185  It instructs that sentences should
be given as “proportionate to the gravity of the offense . . . and the blamewor-
thiness of offenders.”186  While the word “retribution” is not used in the sec-
tion,187 the foregoing phrases demonstrate the same reliance on intrinsic
moral wrongness of actions as justification for punishment.  Under the MPC,
people are to be punished, principally, for the evil inherent in their
actions.188  Florida’s Criminal Punishment Code takes an even stronger
stance: “The primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender.  Reha-
bilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to
the goal of punishment.”189  As such, the sentencing context provides
another opportunity for adherents to a retributive model of justice to
increase the number of drug offenders and inmates nationwide.
IV. THE COST OF FREE WILL
In addition to the illogicality of retribution as a penal goal, enormous
costs have been incurred in its name.  While retribution was not the sole
justification for the passage of laws proscribing drug use and distribution, at
least one member of Congress admitted supporting the law to preserve “the
moral fiber of our Nation.”190  Another’s comments suggest that without
lenient treatment of drug users, the bill was a “mere vehicle for moral indig-
185 The MPC provides:
The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all offi-
cial actors in the sentencing system, are: (a) in decisions affecting the sentencing
of individual offenders: (i) to render sentences in all cases within a range of sever-
ity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and
the blameworthiness of offenders; (ii) when reasonably feasible, to achieve
offender rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offend-
ers, restoration of crime victims and communities, and reintegration of offenders
into the law-abiding community, provided these goals are pursued within the
boundaries of proportionality in subsection (a)(i); and (iii) to render sentences
no more severe than necessary to achieve the applicable purposes in subsections
(a)(i) and (a)(ii) . . . .
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i–iii) (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
186 Id. (emphasis added).
187 See id. Reporter’s Note, cmt. 3 (indicating that the word “retribution” was intention-
ally omitted to avoid its “ideologically charged” connotations).
188 See id. § 1.02(2)(a)(i).  But see id. § 1.02(2)(a)(ii) (stating that where reasonably feasi-
ble, utilitarian aims such as rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation are to be used).
This Note takes the position that those aims should be the principal aims, and that judges
should not be able to eschew these goals in favor of retribution.
189 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.002 (West 2016).
190 116 CONG. REC. S1159, at 1183 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1970) (statement of Sen. Robert
Byrd).
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nation.”191  As such, the theory of retribution bears some responsibility for
the epidemic of mass policing and incarceration of drug users and distribu-
tors.  To start off, the War on Drugs has been extraordinarily costly to local,
state, and federal governments.  Combined, they have spent over one trillion
dollars on policing and punishing drug offenders.192  From arrest to adjudi-
cation, sentencing to incarceration, local, state, and federal governments
spend fifty-one billion dollars per year.193  Further, as recently as 2011, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that nearly half (48%) of federal prison
inmates were serving time for drug offenses.194  In 2014, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) estimated that there were a total of 1,561,231 arrests
nationwide for drug offenses.195  Of these, 83.1% were for possession only.196
Of all drug arrests, 39.7% were for marijuana possession.197  In 2014, in total,
over 620,000 people were arrested for marijuana possession, which means
more than one arrest per minute, every day.198  Simple marijuana possession
accounted for over 5% of all arrests nationwide in 2014.199  The taxpayer
money spent policing and adjudicating drug offenses could be spent rehabili-
tating drug offenders, or on public health, education, or entitlement pro-
grams.200  Additionally, money spent enforcing drug laws could be spent on
investigating, prosecuting, and incarcerating violent criminals.201
Taxpayers are not the only ones suffering at the hand of drug prohibi-
tions.  Communities have been decimated as a result of the lawlessness
incumbent in black market narcotic trafficking.202  In most contexts, people
or businesses can have their disputes ruled on by a judge in a court of law.  In
the world of drug trafficking, disputes over drug deals escalate to violent con-
frontations because drug dealers have no legal recourse for complaints.  Traf-
fickers resort to their own law enforcement techniques, which involve
191 116 CONG. REC. H33603, at 33,616 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1970) (statement of Rep.
Robert Giaimo).
192 Wasted Tax Dollars, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/wasted-tax-
dollars (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
193 Id.
194 E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN
2011 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.
195 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2014, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/persons-ar
rested/main.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Christopher Ingraham, Every Minute, Someone Gets Arrested for Marijuana Possession in
the U.S., WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2015/09/28/every-minute-someone-gets-arrested-for-marijuana-possession-in-the-u-s/.
199 Id.
200 See Wasted Tax Dollars, supra note 192.
201 See GRAY, supra note 114, at 73 (“Every dollar spent on the investigation, prosecu-
tion, and incarceration of drug users and drug dealers is a dollar that cannot be spent on
the investigation, prosecution, and incarceration of other criminals.”).
202 Id. at 72 (“[T]he sale of large quantities of illicit drugs can be a dangerous activity
that generates violent crime.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL515.txt unknown Seq: 25 15-JUN-17 12:28
2017] free  will’s  enormous  cost 2255
intimidation and violence.203  Also, drug dealers become violent with one
another in competing for control over geographical markets.204  Whole city
blocks have been abandoned by police forces because drug traffickers have
made the areas too dangerous to enter without heavily armed forces.205  As a
result, drug dealers create and enforce their own laws, victimizing women
and children.206  Finally, as a result of artificially high drug prices, drug users
engage in criminal behavior to obtain the money to buy drugs.207  The full-
scale prohibition on drugs has thus led to a black market that creates danger-
ous conditions for communities.  If drug laws were designed to promote
social good, community health and safety may not have fallen by the wayside.
V. THE SOLUTION
Retribution should be removed from criminal justice because it has
proven illogical and costly.  First of all, science suggests that its central
assumption, free will, does not exist.  Second of all, retributive passage and
enforcement of drug laws come at enormous cost to taxpayers as well as com-
munities.  As such, if any drug laws are to pass muster, they must be crafted
according to alternative penological goals.  Rehabilitation, deterrence, and
incapacitation are referred to as “consequentialist”208 or “utilitarian”209
because they are ends-based, ordaining the use of punishment as a means to
the end of social good.  These goals, contrasted with retribution, are properly
characterized as forward-looking instead of backward-looking.210  Rather
than punishing offenders by focusing on the prior wrongs they committed,
utilitarian goals punish offenders insofar as the punishment will benefit the
offender and society in the future.
One of those goals is rehabilitation, which calls for the personal
improvement of the offender and reduction in the probability of his future
offending.211  Rehabilitative measures can build offenders’ skills in the mar-
ketplace and treat psychological problems as well as drug addiction.212  This
makes rehabilitation an important penal goal in the sentencing of drug
offenders.  Drug addicts should be conceived of as “diseased and proper sub-
203 Id. (“Sellers of illicit drugs . . . are left to their own enforcement techniques, which
almost always include intimidation and violence.”).
204 Id. (“[T]here is the substantial violence between rival drug dealers.  There is both
the immediate violence of a shooting or knifing and also, on occasion, the danger that one
dealer will try to ruin another by deliberately putting out a bad batch of drugs in his rival’s
territory.”).
205 Id. at 73.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Alschuler, supra note 19, at 2.
209 Cotton, supra note 19, at 1316.
210 See Alschuler, supra note 19, at 2 (“Like the rest of law, criminal punishment should
look forward, not backward.”).
211 Cotton, supra note 19, at 1316.
212 Id. at 1316–17.
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jects for . . . treatment.”213  For much of the nineteenth century, courts
acknowledged rehabilitation as a vital goal in choosing sentences for drug
offenders.214  But with the dawn of the 1980s and the War on Drugs, rehabili-
tative sentencing measures were viewed by some as overly soft on
criminals.215  Since that time, the number of prisoners serving time for drug
offenses has greatly increased.216
Despite the fact that the United States incarcerates a majority of nonvio-
lent criminals, violence runs rampant in our jails and prisons,217 which may
suggest that violent tendencies are created in otherwise nonviolent offenders
during incarceration.  As such, inmates should receive treatment for their
drug addictions and psychological problems in an environment that does not
breed hostility.218  One program, created by the San Francisco County Sher-
iff’s Department, employed a rehabilitation-based model of incarceration
that completely eliminated inmate violence.219  In its Resolve to Stop Vio-
lence Project (RSVP), the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department put violent
inmates together in a dormitory.  Each day, the inmates were instructed on
recognizing the multiple factors that lead to repeat violence and criminal
recidivism.220  An open, conversational environment was fostered, and the
inmates were kept under close supervision throughout the day.221  As a result
of the program, violent incidents went extinct.222  Given the extremely com-
pelling force of addiction and other harmful proclivities, inmates should be
given such treatment-based sentences.223  The foregoing program provides
an example of how focusing on rehabilitating offenders benefits both the
offenders and society by reducing violent tendencies.
213 Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
214 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (“Reformation and rehabilitation
of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”).
215 Peter T. Elikann, Book Review, 88 MASS. L. REV. 112, 112 (2003) (reviewing JAMES L.
NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT (2003)).
216 See supra Part IV.
217 Bandy Lee & James Gilligan, The Resolve to Stop the Violence Project: Transforming an In-
House Culture of Violence Through a Jail-Based Programme, 27 J. PUB. HEALTH 149, 149, 153
(2005).
218 See, e.g., Matt Stout, DA Program Aims to Help Addicts: Middlesex Effort Could Be State’s
Largest, BOS. HERALD (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.bostonherald.com/news/local_cover
age/2016/11/da_program_aims_to_help_addicts#join-conversation (discussing one Mas-
sachusetts district attorney’s office’s efforts to divert first-time drug offenders from jail to
treatment programs).
219 See Lee & Gilligan, supra note 217.
220 Id. at 150.
221 Id. at 150, 153.
222 Id. at 153.
223 See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 13, at 7 (“[I]mpairment in self-control is
the hallmark of addiction.  Brain imaging studies of people with addiction show physical
changes in areas of the brain that are critical to judgment, decision making, learning and
memory, and behavior control.  Scientists believe that these changes alter the way the brain
works and may help explain the compulsive and destructive behaviors of addiction.” (foot-
note omitted)).
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Deterrence is another utilitarian penal goal, and it comes in two vari-
eties.  General deterrence uses punishment to discourage potential criminals
from offending.224  Specific deterrence seeks to persuade a particular
offender from repeating after serving her sentence.225  In the context of
drug addicts, deterrence cannot have much use.  The addict, whose brain
and behavior are altered by the chemical agents in drugs, has enough reason
to cease drug use.  The cost of buying drugs, the painfulness of withdrawal
symptoms, and general negative effects on the user would likely cause him to
halt use if he could.  But as argued, the force of addiction is so compelling
that it overcomes deterrent factors like the possibility of being caught and
charged with drug possession.  But deterrence may well have a place in other
areas of the law.  Offenders who committed white collar crimes, for example,
may more carefully weigh the consequences of their actions when determin-
ing whether to offend.226  As a result, the knowledge of deterrence-based
laws will be a factor that acts on the brain, hopefully a force causally sufficient
to prevent offending.
Finally, the goal of incapacitation uses punishment to isolate especially
dangerous offenders from society.227  In the context of laws affecting nonvio-
lent drug addicts, incapacitation has no place.  Many people view incapacita-
tion as a draconian, pessimistic penal goal, opting to believe that people can
be rehabilitated, even sex offenders.228  In the context of addiction, addicts
violating drug laws to feed their addiction are best viewed as diseased and in
need of treatment.  While threats to themselves, addicts do not pose obvious
threats to society.  Accordingly, they should not be punished purely to isolate
them from their communities.  Due to the harshness of incapacitation, it
should only be used to prevent the most violent offenders from the rest of
society.
CONCLUSION
Shedding the belief in free will is a difficult leap.  It is counterintuitive.
After all, for the vast majority of decisions we make, we feel neither forced
nor coerced.  But the truth or falsity of determinism must not rest on our
intuitive experience of decisionmaking, but on the principles of cause and
effect, given by biology, chemistry, and physics.  It does not take an expert in
neuroscience or an advanced philosopher to understand the argument: our
brains give rise to our consciousness and thus to our decisionmaking process.
And our brains, like all other matter, operate according to specific scientific
principles.  As such, the input the brain receives works with our neural
machinery in a way sufficient to determine our conscious state at any given
224 Cotton, supra note 19, at 1316.
225 See id.
226 See, e.g., Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Madoff,
No. 1:09-cr-00213, 2009 WL 1899501 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2012).
227 See Cotton, supra note 19, at 1316.
228 See generally Paul Eric Stuhff, Comment, Utah’s Children: Better Protected than Most by
New Civil Sex Offender Incapacitation Laws?, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 295 (1998).
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time.  There is no room for an unfixed, unbounded, free decisionmaking
process.
The lack of free will in human experience causes clear problems for
criminal punishment.  Free will is a central assumption of retribution; with-
out the free choice to tear the moral fabric of society, one’s actions cannot
warrant that she receives punishment.  Historical evidence suggests that the
enforcement of drug laws like the Harrison Act and the classification of mari-
juana as Schedule I occurred for retributive purposes.  The Controlled Sub-
stances Act and state drug laws have worked in tandem to effectuate mass
incarceration and proliferation, rather than reduction, of violence stemming
from drug trafficking.  For its invalidity and cost, retribution should not be
used as a penological goal in the creation of laws or sentencing.  Utilitarian
goals, aimed at the social good, should be used in retribution’s place.
